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Abstract 
This study investigated the explanatory power of environmental 
selection perspectives and organizational adaptation perspectives by 
examining the effects of density, intensity of size-localized competition 
and organizational changes on organizational mortality with New York 
City professional legal service industry during 190 1 - 1929. Selection 
perspectives predicted that density, density a t  founding, and intensity 
of size-localized competition will be  positively associated with 
organizational mortality. Results of this study in general provided 
support for the perspectives. The perspectives also predicted tha t  
organizational changes would increase organizational mortality. 
However, results of this study did not provide empirical supports for the 
hypothesis. On the  bas is  of the  empirical results ,  possibility of 
integrating selection perspectives and adaptation perspectives and 
future research directions were discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper  examines a debate  between organizational 
adap ta t ion  perspectives a n d  environmental  selection 
perspectives by investigating the impacts of organizational 
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changes and intensity of size-localized competition on the rates 
of organizational mortality in the New York City professional 
legal service industry from 1901 to 1929. 
The debate is about  the  relative importance of the  two 
perspectives in explaining the source of observed variations in 
organizational structure and behaviors (Child, 1972; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; 
Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). The major difference between 
the perspectives is whether the changes and variations in a n  
organizational population are  due  to random variation by 
organizational birth and dissolution or to the adaptation of 
existing organizations. 
Adaptation model represented by contingency theory had been 
a dominant paradigm in the field of organization theories. The 
model typically focuses on the match between organizational 
structure and environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Child, 
1972; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). The model 
assumes that intentional and planned behaviors of organizations 
a r e  t h e  major  source  of changes  a n d  var ia t ions  i n  a n  
organizational population. However, the model does not rule out 
the possibility of selection (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). 
Organizations of which structures are better matched to their 
environments by rational decision making are assumed to have 
better organizational performance and thus higher chance of 
survival .  Resource dependency model i s  a l so  a k ind  of 
adaptation models, because the model claims that organizations 
behave to reduce its dependence on other organizations and the 
reduct ion  of resource  dependence  i n  t u r n  e n h a n c e s  
organizational performance and survival chance (Pfeffer and 
Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Selection model regards random variations a s  a major force of 
changes in a n  organizational population (McKelvey and Aldrich, 
1983). The model assumes a very high level of organizational 
inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Hannan and Freeman 
(1977) argued that organizations typically have a high level of 
structural inertia because of various internal and external 
constraints. They however revised their theory of organizational 
inertia in their 1984 paper, arguing that organizational inertia is 
a consequence rather than a precursor of selection process. 
They suggested that selection environment favors organizations 
Localized Conzpetition, Organizational Changes, and Organizational Mortality 63 
with structural inertia and winnows out  organizations tha t  
change their s t ructural  aspects.  Because of the s tructural  
inertia and the detrimental effect of organization changes, a 
major source of changes and variations in a n  organizational 
population is organizational birth and dissolution rather than 
the adaptation of existing organizations. Therefore, Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) argued that studying organizational birth and 
dissolution is  a better approach in investigating historical 
changes in a n  organizational population. 
For the applicability of the two models, there seems to be a 
tentative agreement among organizational theorists. Selection 
model  a s s u m e s  a unid i rec t ional  inf luence of select ion 
environments on organizations a s  well as the  inability of 
organizations in successfully changing their core elements. 
Adaptation model a s sumes  tha t  organizations have slack 
resources to absorb the impact of changes in core elements and 
that organizations can influence their selection environments by 
using various strategic moves. 
Compared with small organizations, large ones are  more 
capable of changing their environments and have more slack 
resources to change their core elements. For this reason, several 
scholars argued that adaptation model could be applied to a 
small number of large organizations and selection model to a 
large number of small organizations (Scott, 1992). Hannan and 
Freeman (1984), however, did not agree with the argument. They 
maintained that the level of structural inertia increases with the 
size of organizations and thus large organizations are less likely 
to reorganize their structure than small ones. Even though large 
organizations are less likely to dissolve because of their slack 
resources, those organizations a re  also replaced by other  
organizations when we use a n  observation window of a longer 
time span (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984). 
Current conception about relationship between organizational 
size and the applicability of adaptation and selection model 
however has been oversimplified. We observed that even small 
organizations can adapt  to their selection environments by 
changing the way of absorbing critical resources through the 
formation of collectives. For instance, a n  association of small 
organizations can influence legislative authority and government 
agencies to impede the entry of large organizations into their 
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market segments. 
This paper examines the applicability of the two models to the 
popula t ion  charac ter ized  by a large n u m b e r  of smal l  
organizations. For empirically comparing explanatory power of 
t h e  competing models ,  we c a n  investigate the  effects of 
organizational changes and  population characteristics on 
organizational mortality. If we find the detrimental effects of 
organizational changes and  predicted effect of population 
characteristics, the results will support environmental selection 
model. If we get predicted effects of organizational changes and 
insignificant effects of population characteristics, the results will 
favor adaptation model. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Environmental selection model 
Hannan and Freeman (1986, 1988, 1989) argued that the 
mortality rates of social organizations depend on population 
density - the total number of organizations in a population that 
a focal organization is included - as well a s  the properties of 
individual organizations. At low densities, the growth of a 
population can decrease mortality rates of organizations. To 
provide the hypothesis, Hannan and Freeman relied on the 
argument of institutional theory, which is  tha t  the lack of 
organizational legitimacy due to small number of organizations 
in an organizational population increases their mortality rates 
(cf., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott 
and Meyer, 1983). 
To sus ta in ,  organizations should continuously acquire 
resources from their environments (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The rarity of organizations with a similar 
organizat ional  form undermines  t h e  legitimacy of s u c h  
organizations. Compared with institutionalized organizations, 
organizations absent of social legitimacy have difficulties in 
mobilizing external resources (Stinchcombe, 1965). It is mainly 
because  the re  i s  l i t t le congruence between activities of 
organizations with a new form and the expectations of the 
society. For ins t ance ,  b a n k s  would n o t  lend money to  
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organizations with a new form because those banks cannot 
estimate the success probability of those organizations. Capable 
people would not bet their career with the new firms because 
their prospect is very susceptible. 
The increase in the number of organizations with a new form 
heightens the visibility of the new organizational form, thus 
making them more familiar and augmenting their political 
capabilities (Hannan and Freeman, 19891. When the number of 
organizations grows, organizations with a new form can claim 
their institutional standing (Hannan and Freeman, 1988). As a 
result, at low density, increase in density would decrease the 
death rates by increasing the legitimacy of a population using 
the form. 
At high densities, competition force presumably overwhelms 
legitimation forces (Hannan and Freeman. 1989). Organizations 
that occupy the same market niche have to compete with one 
another for acquiring similar resources because the carrying 
capacity of the niche is usually limited (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). When the density is high enough to acquire legitimacy 
from the society, additional growth in density cannot enhance 
the legitimacy of a population anymore. Instead, growth in 
density increases the intensity and likelihood of competition 
within the population. The increased intensity of competition 
heightens the mortality rates of organizations in the population 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Combining the legitimation and 
competition processes, Hannan and Freeman predicted a U- 
shaped relationship between density and organizational 
mortality. In other words, they predicted that the density has a 
negative effect on mortality rates and the squared term of 
density has a positive effect. The legitimation process produces 
the negative effect of density and the competition process entails 
the positive effect of density-squared term. 
The curvilinear relationship between density and 
organizational mortality rates has been supported in many 
previous studies (Baron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Carroll, 
Presendorfer, Swaminathan, and Wiedenmayer. 1993; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1987, 1988; Tucker, Singh, and Mainhard, 1990). 
However, Anderson (1988) found only the competition effect - 
the positive relation between density and death rate - with 
three different industries and Barnett (1990) also found only the 
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competition effect in a population of a n  early US telephone 
industry. Delacroix, Swaminathan and Solt's study (1989) did 
not provide supporting evidence of the curvilinear effect in the 
California wine industry, when they controlled the effects of 
foundings and failures of previous year. Opposite to Hannan and 
Freeman's prediction, Singh, Tucker, and House (1986) found a 
statistically significant negative effect of population density on 
organizational mortality in a population of voluntary service 
organizations. 
Data on professional legal service industry in New York City 
collected for this study are left-censored. Though law firms in 
New York City existed before 1850, I collected data from 1901 
because of difficulty in collecting data for earlier years. A review 
of prior research on the relationship between density and 
organizat ional  mortality summarized  t h a t  left-censored 
populations do not produce the effect of legitimation process but 
the effect of competition process (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). 
Since law firms in New York City were institutionalized before 
190 1, only the competition process is hypothesized as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: The density of law firms will be positively 
associated with the death rate of law Jrrns. 
Carroll and Hannan (1989) examined the effect of density at  
the time of a n  organization's founding on its mortality. They 
proposed that the density at  founding have a delayed effect on 
organizational mortality rate. They argued that organizations 
founded at  high density are more susceptible to dying because of 
liability of resource scarcity and tight niche packing. High 
density at  founding indicates intense competition at  the time of 
a n  organization's founding and the intense competition at 
founding crea tes  condit ions of resource  scarci ty.  When 
resources are scarce, new organizations cannot move quickly 
from initial founding stage to full-scale operation and thus face 
strong selection pressures. Even if some organizations can 
survive the initial period, they do not have enough resources for 
creating formal organizational structure and highly reproducible 
routines. 
Tight niche packing is related with the amount and quality of 
exploitable resources. High density and intense competition a t  
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the  time of founding means  few exploitable resources a re  
remained for new e n t r a n t s .  Because  newly founded 
organizations can hardly compete head-to-head with established 
organizations, new entrants tend to be pushed to thinly spread 
and ephemeral resource space. The new entrants can try to 
exploit richer center of resources a t  some later time, otherwise 
those entrants cannot accumulate resources enough to buffer 
environmental shocks. The reorganization process however 
increases the mortality rate, since structures and routines for 
exploiting an  inferior region of resources presumably differ from 
those for a richer center of resource space. Carroll and Hannan 
(1989) found supporting evidence of the argument from four 
populations (American labor unions, Argentinean newspaper, 
Newspaper publishers in  S a n  Francisco region, American 
breweries),  b u t  did not  find suppor t ing  evidence from a 
population of Irish newspapers. Following Carroll and Hannan's 
argument, I hypothesize as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: Density at the time of a law firm's founding will 
be positively associated with death rate of the lawBrm. 
Several critics charged that  the density dependence model 
treats all members of a population a s  competitors for acquiring 
same scarce resources and the members thus compete with one 
another (Winter, 1990). Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989) 
however already mentioned the inequivalence of competition. 
They argued t h a t  t h e  in tens i ty  of competi t ion among  
organizations is  predicted to be a function of similarity in  
organizational resource requirements: The more similar the 
resource requirements of two organizations, the greater the 
potential for intense competition between the organizations. It is 
obvious that organizations occupying same niche compete more 
intensely with one another than the organizations occupying 
different niches do. The equivalence assumption might be a 
reasonable starting point. If we have any variable that can cause 
localized competition, however, we had better incorporate the 
localized competition in our model. 
Several recent studies captured the effects of organizational 
differences on the intensity of competition (e.g., Baum and 
Haveman, 1997; Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Baum and Singh, 
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1996; Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 2001; Podolny, Stuart, and 
Hannan, 1996). For instance, Barnett (1990) disaggregated the 
density of multipoint1] and single point competitors to examine 
how specific theoret ical ly d iscerned subpopu la t ions  of 
organizations interact with one another. He found that  the 
competitive effects of dens i ty  of single a n d  mul t ipoin t  
competitors on organizational mortality were localized within 
strategic groups. The analysis showed that  memberships of 
single and multipoint competitors determine the patterns of 
competitive interactions between single point and multipoint 
competitors. 
With American brewing industry, Carroll and Wade (1991) 
disaggregated density according to geographic location and 
showed tha t  the characteristics of local population better 
represent competition process than  those of national level 
population do. Swaminathan and Wedenmayer (199 1) also found 
similar results in a study of the German brewing industry. 
Similarly, Baum and Singh (1994a, 1994b) disaggregated the 
density according to the similarity in the ages of the children 
served by day care centers and in geographic location. The 
findings indicate that the intensity of competition between day 
care centers increases with both the extent of overlap in the ages 
of children served and geographic proximity. 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) proposed more specific models of 
size-localized competition. They discussed a model in which 
intrapopulation competition is localized by organizational size. 
They suggested a n  idea that organizations with different sizes in 
a populat ion adop t  different s t ra tegies  a n d  s t r u c t u r e s .  
Therefore, organizations of different sizes, though engaged in 
similar activities, depend on different mixes of resources. This 
a rgument  implies t h a t  intensi ty of competition faced by 
organizations in a population depends on the size distribution of 
other  organizations. By using simulation techniques and  
historical da ta  of New York City banks and life insurance 
companies, Hannan, Rager-Moore, and Banaszak-Holl (1900) 
explored how size-localized competition would affect evolution of 
size distribution. However, their data and analysis did not allow 
1) Multipoint competitors are rivals that compete in more than one market 
segment or business. 
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them to examine the impacts of size-localized competition on the 
failure rate of organizations. With Manhattan hotel industry, 
Baum and Mezias (1992) empirically examined the effect of size- 
localized competition in addition to location-localized and price- 
localized competition. They found that organizations with larger 
number of competitors of similar size have higher failure rate. 
Size has been very important strategic variable in New York 
City professional legal service industry. In the early twentieth 
century, lawyers were seldom specialized in a single practice 
area and the required work for providing professional legal 
service to client was not so complex because the law itself was 
not well developed and complicated. Still, large lawsuit and 
business legal claims required a lot of work that could not be 
handled by a single lawyer. In other words, large law firms 
served large-scale lawsuits and clients, and small firms served 
for small cases. Accordingly, Spurr  (1987) found a positive 
association between the size of law firms and tha t  of legal 
claims. The size also indicates the degree of institutional 
specialization. In other words, large law firms provided various 
legal services from business law to immigration, while small law 
firms were specialized in some specific practice areas. 
Following earlier research on size-localized competition and 
the historical evidence from legal industry, I propose following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The larger the number of law $rms with similar 
size that a law firm has, the more likely thefrrm will experience 
dissolution. 
Organizational change and mortality 
Environmental selection model suggests that organizational 
changes, especially fundamental reorganization, increase the 
mortality of organizations. Hannan and Freeman (1984) argued 
that organizational changes and reorganization attempts that 
requi re  t h e  revision of es tabl i shed work rou t ines ,  t h e  
modification of communication patterns, and regrouping of work 
groups raise organizational mortality rate, because the changes 
hamper the reliability of organizational performance. 
In contrast to the selection view, organizational adaptation 
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perspective suggests that  organizational changes reflect the 
decisions and strategies of rational leaders and dominant 
coalition in organizations in response to environmental changes 
and t h u s  the changes can  enhance the survival chance of 
organizations. For instance, contingency theorists argued that 
organizational structure should be matched to the contextual 
demands of size, environment, and technology (Burns and 
Stalker, 196 1 ; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). 
The contingency model implies that organizations that change 
their structural elements to match environmental changes will 
perform better. 
Similarly, resource  dependency model sugges t s  t h a t  
organizations depend upon their environments for acquiring 
resources critical to  their survival. To ,minimize resource 
dependence on external environments and critical uncertainty, 
organizations should a t tempt  M&As, joint ventures ,  and  
interlocking directorates (Burt, Christman, and Kilburn, J r .  
1980; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This 
model implies that strategic move to reduce a n  organization's 
dependence on external environments can enhance the survival 
chance of the organization. Scholars in the field of strategic 
management (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1984) and organizational 
learning (Levinthal and March, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1984) 
also proposed the same relationship between organizational 
changes and success. 
Examining the  effect of organizational changes on  the  
mortality rate of voluntary service organizations in Toronto 
metropolitan area, Singh, House, and Tucker (1986) reported 
tha t  two kinds of changes (executive change and location 
change) among six reduce the hazard of organizational mortality 
and other two changes (service area change and sponsor change) 
increase the hazard. However, the authors failed to find any 
significant impacts of goal change and structural change on the 
mortality rate. The authors interpreted the mixed results by 
adopting the notion of the location of changes in organizations. 
Singh and his colleagues argued that selection perspectives best 
describe changes in the core elements of organizations, which 
require serious revision of existing core routines. On the other 
hand, adaptation perspectives best describe peripheral changes, 
which do not require important changes in core routines or 
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capabilities of organizations. 
The most  important  resource of professional service 
organizations i s  h u m a n  resource (Pennings,  Lee, and  
Witteloostuijn, 1998). By acquiring or bringing up  eminent 
professionals, a professional service firm can get a good 
reputation and thus can get more clients with greater resources 
(Smigel, 1967). About the nature of competition in professional 
legal service industry, Stephen Bill (1990), the editor of The 
American Lawyer, put it this way. ". . . the real competition among 
professional [law] firms is for product (i.e., lawyers), not for 
customers. The lawyers bring in customers, just the way, for 
example, authors bring customers to book publishers." 
However, the addition of eminent lawyers, M&A of law firms, 
and organizational split  requires changes in partnership 
agreement among lawyers, which is a fundamental change in 
law firms. Additions of new partners from outside of the firm 
indicate changes in clients and frequently changes in product 
mix. Especially when a law firm is  small,  the  impact of 
membership changes on organizational routines i s  very 
substantial. 
In sum, selection perspective predicts that three organizational 
changes in this study-major M&A, major organizational split, 
and the acquisition of eminent lawyers-will raise mortality of 
law firms that experienced those changes. However, adaptation 
perspective predicts that M&As of law firms and the addition of 
eminent lawyers to the firm will decrease the mortality of law 
firms. The perspective predicts that major organizational split 
will increase the mortality of law firms, since the event means 




Data used for this study are life history information on 719 
law firms that operated in New York City at any time from 1901 
to 1929. Hubbel's legal directory that was annually published 
was used to construct the life history of law firms. The directory 
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provides the names of law firms, the names of lawyers affiliated 
with each law firm, and legal practice areas of each law firm. 
Solo practitioners were not included in the sample, because the 
life of a firm with single practitioner is closely related with the 
life of the lawyer and thus the firm may not be considered as  a 
going concern. One hundred and fifty-nine law firms were 
already existent at the start of observation (i.e., year 1901) and 
their founding years were not traced. During the observation 
period, 581 law firms were founded and 459 firms dissolved. 
Two hundred and sixty law firms were still alive in 1929, which 
were right-censored in this study. The average size of New York 
CiQ law firms grew from 3.5 in 190 1 to 5.5 Iin 1929. 
Measurement 
Founding and failure: The year of a law firm's founding was 
measured by the year that the law firm first appeared in the 
directory. One problem in measuring organizational founding is 
inability to identify founding years of 159 law firms that were 
already operative in year 1901. I assigned year 1901 a s  the 
founding year of those firms and added a dummy variable for 
left-censored cases in statistical analyses. The year of a law 
firm's failure was measured by the year that the law firm was 
permanently delisted from the directory. 
Size: The size of each law firm was measured in each year as  
the number of lawyers working for the firm - generally accepted 
measure of size in professional service industry. The lawyers 
include partners who are residual claimants for the profits of the 
firm, counsels who usually used to be partners of the firm and 
are close to retire, and associate lawyers who are employees with 
fixed payment and can  be promoted to par tners  after a 
probationary period. 
Population density: Population density was measured as  the 
total number of law firms existed a t  the start of each year. 
According to Hypothesis 1, the density is predicted to have a 
positive effect on organizational mortality a s  the intensity of 
competition increases with the density. 
Mass: A mass of each law firm was measured by the total 
number of lawyers who were affiliated with any law firm in New 
York City except for the lawyers in the focal law firm. To reduce 
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the skewness in the distribution of mass, natural logarithm was 
taken for the mass. The variable was included in empirical 
models to control the effect of organizational size on mortality. 
Intensity of size-localized competition: Following the work of 
Hannan and his colleagues (Hannan and Ranger-Moore, 1990; 
Hannan, Ranger-Moore, and Banaszak-Holl, 1990), the intensity 
of size-localized competition is measure by using the Euclidean 
distance of a focal law firm to other law firms in the population. 
Size difference between the focal organization and every other 
organization is converted to a Euclidean distance a s  D,, 
= im, where S,, and SJt are size of firm i and firm j at  time t, 
respectively. 
D,, increases as  a focal organization deviates from the center of 
size distribution of other organizations in terms of size. Thus, 
small value for DL, indicates intense competition because the 
focal organization h a s  a large number  of s imilar-sized 
organizations. If the size-localized competition is related with 
higher mortality rate, then D,, is predicted to have a negative 
relationship with organizational mortality. The measure DL, 
assumes that all organizations compete with one another on the 
basis of their size similarity. If the assumption is correct, the 
largest organization has the biggest advantage in competition, 
which allows the organization to grow faster than any other 
organizations. The self-accelerating process generates extreme 
monopolies tha t  do not seem to be empirically plausible. 
Hannan, Ranger-Moore, and Banaszak-Holl (1990) tried to solve 
the problem by introducing the notion of competitive window. 
They assume tha t  organizations compete only with other 
organizations with some range of their own size. To measure 
size-localized competition with the competitive window, Hannan 
and his colleagues suggested following formula. DL, = ,I,, 
where S,, a n d  SJ, are  size of firm i a n d  firm j a t  time t,  
respectively, and p is the range of competition window. 
However, how to determine the width of the competition 
window (p) is not theoretically developed yet. Baum and Mezias 
(1992) used the size of a focal organization divided by 2 as  p. In 
other words, competitors of an  organization i with a size of S,, are 
organizations whose size is larger than 0.5 * S,( and smaller than 
1.5 * SLt. The formula incorporates a nice feature of competition 
as  larger organizations have wider competitive window. It might 
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be a better approximation of reality, because in many industries 
the distribution of size measured by the number of employees or 
sales volume usually has a shape like x2 distribution, which has 
dense distribution in small size and sparse distribution in large 
size. This is why many organizational studies take natural 
logarithm when they use a measure of organizational size. 
Baum and  Mezias's formula however ,does not  correctly 
incorporate the nature of competition. If we ,use the formula, a n  
organization with a sue  of 11 is considered as a competitor of a 
focal organization with a size of 20. However, a n  organization 
with a size of 20 is not considered a s  a competitor of a focal 
organization with a size of 11. The width that varies with the 
logarithm of size, which was experimented by Hannan, Ranger- 
Moore, and Banaszak-Holl (1990), also lead to a n  asymmetric 
competition as Baum a n d  Mezias (1990) did. In  strategy 
formulation processes, CEOs of a n  organization A may not 
consider other organization B as its competitor even though B 
considers A as its competitor. When we investigate strategy 
formulation process, the asymmetry assumption is defendable. 
In studying organizational mortality, however, we are interested 
in real competition in market rather than the cognition of CEOs. 
By definition, if A is a competitor of B, B is also a competitor of 
A. 
To incorporate the symmetric nature of competition and the 
ac tua l  distribution of size, I used a fixed width with the  
logarithm of organizational size. In other words, the width of 
competitive window (Log@)) can be expressed as I Log(S,J - 
Log(S,J ( = Log(p). If we take an  exponential to each side of the 
inequality, we get Max [(S,,/S,J, (SJ,/S,J] = p. In this formula, p of 
2 for example means that a focal organization competes with 
organizations that are not only larger than the half of the focal 
organization b u t  also smaller t h a n  the  twice of the  focal 
organization. The formula for calculating Euclidean distance 
i n .  Because I do not have a used in this study is DL, = ,ax,s,,.,,,,s,,, 
priori rationale for the p, five different values of ~ ( 1 . 5 ,  2, 3, 4, 5) 
are selected to examine the explanatory power of the width. 
Organizat ional  changes :  I identified th ree  k i n d s  of 
organizational changes in New York City professional legal 
service industry.  Firs t ,  major merger a n d  acquisition was 
identified when a law firm merged with or acquired other law 
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firm whose size was larger than the half of the acquiring firm. 
Second, major split was flagged when more than one-third of a 
focal firm's lawyers quitted the firm and established a law firm 
of their own. Third, acquisition of eminent lawyers was defined 
by the change in the name of a law firm due to the addition of 
new lawyers. Law firms usually changed their names by adding 
the last names of new partners to their firm names when 
eminent  lawyers joined the  firm. The three  kinds  of 
organizational changes presumably have lagged effects on 
organizational mortality. For instance, the addition of eminent 
lawyers may decrease the possibility of a law firm's failure in 
that year as  well as  in later years. Unlike RATE program, BMDP 
2L that was used for this paper has a shortcoming in handling 
the  functional  form of lagged effects. Thus ,  I used the  
cumulative number of previous organizational changes of same 
kind in estimating Cox regression model. 
Model and Estimation 
I estimated the effects of intensity of size-localized competition 
and organizational changes on organizational mortality by using 
Cox (1972) proportional hazqrd model. The' model is given by h(t; 
z) = b ( t )  exp(pz), where $is a vector of unknown regression 
coefficients for independent variables z, and h(t)  is an  unknown 
hazard function for an  organization with vector z=0. In this 
model, no parametric model is assumed for the underlying 
hazard function b(t) .  For causality, time varying covariates are 
assumed to have one year lagging effect in this study. BMDP 2L 
was used for estimating the parameter estimates p. 
RESULTS 
Yearly distribution of major variables is presented in Table 1. 
Yearly changes in density and mass indicate that the number of 
law firms and that of lawyers who were affiliated with law firms 
had  increased over time for 1901- 1929.  The number  of 
foundings in year 1901 is 158 in the table. The number is not 
exactly the number of firms founded in 1901, but the number of 
law firms that had been established until 1901 and were still 
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TABLE 1. Yearly Distribution of  Major Variables 
~&ent  Major Major 
Year Founchgs Failures Density Mass 































alive in year 1901. For 29 years of observation, there were 399 
cases of the acquisition of eminent lawyers, 50 cases of major 
split, and 69 cases of major mergers and acquisitions. From 
1902 to 1929, 561 law firms were founded and 459 firms 
dissolved in New York City. 
Table 2 reports the estimates of Cox proportional hazard 
regression. In table 2, winX means that a focal firm competes 
only with other organizations of which size is smaller than X -  
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TABLE 2. Results of Proportional Hazard Regression Analysis 
Variables 
Size at Foundmg 






Degree of Freedom 
Log-Likelihood 
Model 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .lo; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed test) 
times the size of the focal firm and larger than 1/X-times of the 
size. Model 1 estimates a model of density and mass dependence 
along with the effect of organizational changes. Model 2 is for 
additionally investigating the effect of legitimation process. 
The density has a statistically significant positive effect on 
organizational mortality in Model 1, but the effect disappeared 
when I added the squared term of density in Model 2. As the 
78 Seoul Journal of Business 
Degree of Freedom 
Log-Likelihood 
I 
TABLE 2. (Continued) 
change in log-likelihood a t  the bottom of table 2 indicates, the 
addition of the squared term of density did not significantly 
enhance the explanatory power of estimated model. The results 
Variables 
Size at Foundmg 








strongly support Hypothesis 1. As hypothesis 1 suggested, 
legitimation process was not operative from year 1901 to 1929 in 
the New York City legal service industry. Law firms might have 
been already legitimized before year 190 1 - year starting the 
observation of law firms for this study. Removing the density- 
Model 
6 7 8 9 
-0.052 -0.136*** -0.091*** -0.051 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.332 -0.322 -0.345* -0.357* 
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.202) 
-0.202*** -0.178** -0.189*** -0.201*** 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
0.440* 0.597** 0.502* 0.421* 
(0.261) (0.258) (0.259) (0.261) 
-0.376* -0.507** -0.450** -0.396* 
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
squared term from Model 2 did not significantly reduce the 
goodness of fit (x2 =0.0246 with 1 degree of freedom). Therefore, 
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the density-squared term was not included in other models. 
I tried various specifications of size-localized competition and 
in this paper I reported only the part of results in model 3 
through model 9. In model 7, 8, and 9 ,  the density was not 
included as  an  independent variable because both the density 
and the intensity of size-localized competition can represent the 
competition process. 
The coefficient estimate for a dummy indicating left-censored 
cases is not significant in all models except for model 8 and 9. 
This result indicates that law firms founded before 1901 have 
only marginal survival advantages over newly founded law firms. 
Organizational size at  founding has a statistically significant and 
negative effect on firm mortality in all models except for model 9. 
The results suggest that the larger the size of a law firm a t  
founding, the lower the possibility of mortality the firm has. The 
finding supports a random work hypothesis,2) because the size 
can be regarded as  the amount of initial stock resources. The 
coefficient estimate for Mass is very unstable across models. 
From model 1 to 6, the estimate is negative but it is positive in 
other models. The results indicate that organizational size itself 
is not important when the effect of size-localized competition is 
controlled. 
Comparison of resu l t s  t ha t  a r e  provided by various 
specifications of competitive window suggests that p of 3 is the 
best approximation of size-localized competition among p of 1.5, 
2, 3 ,  4, and 5 in New York City professional legal service 
industry for 1901-1929. When 1.5 or 2 is used as  a value of p, 
the number of law firms outside the competitive window has a 
statistically significant and negative effect on organizational 
m~rta l i ty .~)  The result suggests that a focal firm competes not 
only with others located within a competitive window but also 
with other firms located outside the competitive window, which 
is not plausible for the assumption of localized competition. 
When 4 or 5 is used for a value of p, the coefficient estimate of 
2) The hypothesis posits that the growth and decline of organizations are the 
results of a random walk process. As a result, an organization founded with a 
larger amount of initial stock resources is less likely to dissolve (Levinthal, 
199 1) 
3) The results when I got by adding the number of other firms located outside 
the competitive window to each model were not reported here. They were 
available from the author. 
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the  intensity of size-localized competition variable is  less  
significant than when 3 is used for the value of p. Additionally, 
the log-likelihood indicates that p of 3 is better than p of other 
values in explaining organizational mortality in the current 
population. All the findings suggest that New York City law firms 
from 1901 to 1929 competed with other firms of which size is 
larger than 1/3-times and smaller than 3 times of the size of the 
focal firm. 
When the density-squared term was taken out from models, 
the coefficient estimates of density are statistically significant 
and positive in all models. The findings provided strong support 
for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that density at  the time of 
a law firm's founding will be positively associated with death rate 
of the law firm. However, density at  founding did not have any 
significant effect on organizational dissolution. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the larger the number of other law 
firms with similar size that a focal law firm has, the more likely 
the firm will experience organizational mortality. Model 3 
in t roduced a variable for t h e  in tens i ty  of size-localized 
competition without any restriction on competitive window. In 
other words, a law firm was assumed to compete with all other 
law firms. The coefficient estimate for size-localized competition 
is not statistically significant in the model. A separate analysis 
not reported in Table 2 however showed that the estimate is 
statistically significant and negative, when the density was taken 
out from Model 3 .  As predicted by Hypothesis 3, Euclidean 
d i s t ance  represent ing  size-localized competi t ion with a 
competitive window of p being 1.5, 2, or 3 has  statistically 
significant and negative effects on organizational mortality in all 
models. The results suggested that  law firms compete more 
intensely with similar sized law firms than with law firms of 
different size. 
Environmental selection perspectives predicted that  major 
organizational changes would increase organizational mortality. 
All of the  coefficient est imates for organizational change 
variables are statistically significant. The acquisition of eminent 
lawyers and  major mergers and acquisitions significantly 
decreased the probabilities of organizational mortality, while 
major  organizat ional  sp l i t  increased  t h e  h a z a r d s  of 
organizational dissolution. The results did not support the 
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selection perspectives. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This  s t u d y  invest igated t h e  explanatory  power of 
environmental  selection perspectives a n d  organizational 
adaptation perspectives by examining the effects of density, the 
intensity of size-localized competition and  organizational 
changes  on  organizational mortality with New York City 
professional  legal service i n d u s t r y  dur ing  1 9 0  1 - 1929 .  
Environmental selection perspectives predicted that  density, 
dens i ty  a t  founding,  a n d  t h e  in tens i ty  of size-localized 
competition will be positively associated with organizational 
mortality. Results of this study in general provided support for 
t h e  perspect ives.  The  perspect ives a l so  predicted t h a t  
organizational changes would increase organizational mortality, 
a s  the changes will hamper the reproducibility of organizations. 
However, results of this study did not provide empirical supports 
for the hypothesis. 
This study suggested that  both selection perspectives and 
adaptation perspectives were required to explain the evolution of 
a population. In other words, not only organizational founding 
and dissolution but  also major organizational changes were 
engines for population-level evolution. This study also suggested 
that Scott's (1987) argument-adaptation model is adequate for 
a population with a small number of large organizations and 
selection model for a population with a large number of small 
organizations-is a n  oversimplification. This study also showed 
that reconciliation of Singh, House, and Tucker (1986) is not 
adequate. Singh, House, and Tucker (1986) found mixed results 
when they examined the effects of various organizational 
changes on organizational mortality. These scholars interpreted 
the  resul ts  tha t  changes in  core s t ruc ture  might increase 
organizational failure rate and changes in peripheral structure 
would decrease the failure rate. Contrary to the interpretation, 
New York City professional legal service industry from 1901 to 
1929 showed that even changes in core structure such as  major 
mergers and acquisitions and the acquisition of eminent lawyers 
decreased organizational mortality. 
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The findings however might be specific to New York City 
professional service industry from 1901 and 1929. Compared to 
organizations in other industries, law firms were much easier to 
establish for the lawyers at that time, because lawyers did not 
have to have large sum of resources to establish a law firm. To 
establish a law firm at  that time, lawyers need reputation a s  
competent lawyers and financial resources to rent an  office. 
Furthermore, membership changes in law firms might be much 
easier  t h a n  s t ruc tu ra l  or strategic reorganization in 
manufacturing industries. The other possibility is that small size 
of law firms during the observation period may reduce the 
detrimental effects of organizational reorganizations. These 
limitations suggest further future research on professional 
service industries. This kind of future research can suggest 
whether hypotheses provided by selection model and adaptation 
model can be applicable to professional service industries. 
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